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1. Introduction 
     The chairperson (chair) and chief executive officer (CEO) are the two key employees of a 
company that make strategic decisions with long term implications for performance. The chair 
leads the board of directors plus the selection and performance management processes for the 
CEO (Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 1996; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003a; Dalton & Dalton, 2005; 
Krause and Semadeni, 2013). The CEO manages the company on a day to day basis and 
endeavors to deliver outcomes that are valued by stakeholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Goodstein 
& Boecker, 1991; Johnson et al, 1996; Withers, Hillman & Cannella, 2012). Having a CEO and 
chair with years of company specific experience in their roles is generally seen as an important 
asset for the company with positive performance implications (Johnson, Schnatterly and Hill, 
2013). Research on the performance outcomes of tenure is, however, quite mixed (Johnson et al., 
2013) and tends to focus on CEO tenure without taking into account the broader board and 
governance context (e.g., the insider ratio).  
 
     Most corporate governance research to date has been undertaken using samples of United 
States companies (Boyd, Haynes and Zona, 2011). As a result, these studies tend to focus on 
United States governance configurations where companies have a strong preference for chair and 
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CEO duality, meaning that the chair and CEO are the same person. For example, duality is used 
in more than 68 per cent of cases on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) compared with less 
than 10 per cent in Australia (Fitzroy, Hulbert and Ghobandian, 2012).  
 
     As distinct from duality, separation of the chair and CEO is preferred among Australian and 
London Stock Exchange listed companies (Dalton & Dalton, 2005; Fitzroy et al., 2012). In 
Australia the chair is usually an outside director, providing an important mentoring and counter-
balancing role to the power of the CEO who leads the executive team. Choices on separation and 
board composition in Australia reflect long run institutional pressures to adopt guidelines for best 
practice informed by agency theory outlined, for example, in the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX) Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (2014). So in the Australian 
institutional setting the chair has considerable power given his or her right to hire, performance 
manage and fire the CEO if need be (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003a). In practice the United 
Kingdom has followed a similar direction on corporate governance practices following findings 
published in the Cadbury Report of 1992 and the Higgs Review of 2003 (Boyd, 1996; Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003a; Aguilera, 2005; Dalton & Dalton, 2005).  
 
     By taking an in-depth look at Australian governance structures and performance outcomes, 
this study tries to contribute to governance theory in general and provide a more robust 
theoretical underpinning of board effectiveness in different contexts. Since the Australian 
governance system is biased towards separation, the relationship between the chair and CEO is 
more likely to be interpersonal with group decision making implications. In such a context, 
tenure can be an indication of harmony across the management team and board in general. 
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However, it is also possible that high tenure is a symptom of less healthy group dynamics with 
limited opportunities to express different views and provide constructive critique (Leenders and 
Wierenga, 2008). Things can become “too comfortable in the saddle” among work colleagues 
who lose their performance edge. So while chair CEO co-tenure can be a good thing if the board 
has a limited number of inside directors, there might be specific boards with a high insider ratio 
where high chair CEO co-tenure is not very productive.  
 
     The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, while there has been much research into 
the CEO tenure and organization performance relationship in the United States, there has been 
little research looking at chair and CEO co-tenure and organization performance in business 
settings such as Australia where separation is the predominant practice. Second, the interplay 
between chair and CEO co-tenure will be studied in a wider board context that can amplify or 
mitigate the benefits that high CEO chair co-tenure can have on organization performance. This 
is achieved by exploring the interaction of chair CEO co-tenure and the insider ratio with 
organization performance to provide new insight in a not well understood area. This is 
interesting as the CEO and sometimes a small number of key executives will be appointed to the 
board as inside directors (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Johnson et al., 1996); the value of the presence 
of inside directors to the organization is an under researched area (Johnson et al, 1996). The CEO 
is often the lead inside director in Australian business. Finally, this study provides a 
methodological contribution by estimating parsimonious models using a holdout sample to 
predict performance and compare this result with real performance of companies as observed in 
the marketplace (Woodside, 2013). 
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     The theoretical underpinning for this study is provided by traditional governance theories 
such as agency theory, stewardship theory, resource dependence theory, institutional theory, 
legal theory and social network theory (Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Shen, 2003; Lynall, Golden & 
Hillman, 2003; Boyd et al., 2011). Multi-theoretic research into corporate governance including 
the integration of theories to enhance the explanatory power of the study (Boyd et al., 2011) is 
useful in building theoretical and practical insight into the complex human and social 
interactions of the chair, CEO and inside directors (Johnson et al, 1996; Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003; Dalton & Dalton, 2005). In addition, theories on team decision making and the value and 
limitations of having different perspectives are introduced. As stated before, the aim is to 
understand the performance amplification and mitigation effects around the co-tenure dyad of the 
two key positions in most organizations - the chair and CEO. The key argument that is explained 
in the theoretical framework is that chair CEO co-tenure can deliver high performance outcomes 
but can also have negative consequences when the inside director ratio is also high, leading to a 
situation where high performance is not achieved. This is the work situation work colleagues 
become “too comfortable in the saddle” working together.  
 
     The article is structured as follows. First the theoretical background and hypothesis 
development is provided. Second is the explanation of the method and the data. Third the results 
are presented followed fourth by the discussion and conclusion. 
 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
2.1 Theoretical background 
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     There has been a greater interest in and focus on governance research and practice since the 
stock market crash of 1987, and the global financial crisis of the 2000s has reinforced this trend. 
Governance research considers a wide range of issues including but not limited to chief 
executive officer (CEO) and director selection, the job attributes and tenure of the chair and CEO 
respectively, the average tenure and ratio of inside directors, the ratio and tenure of outside 
directors, board size, teamwork on the board, and board effectiveness. Achieving and 
maintaining the effective contribution of the chair, CEO and board of director members to 
organization performance through selection, tenure and board process are matters of robust 
debate in business and academic communities around the world (Johnson et al, 1996;  Dalton & 
Dalton, 2005; Hambrick, Werder & Zajac, 2008; Fuenzalida, Mongrut, Artega & Erausquin, 
2013). Time and employee tenure are important research concepts (Mosakowski & Earley, 2000; 
Simsek, 2007). The empirical research here draws on agency theory, stewardship theory and 
resource dependence theory. 
 
     Agency theory argues that CEOs and inside directors in a position of power and influence will 
make opportunistic decisions in their own interests possibly to the detriment of the firm's goals 
and the interests of the owner’s they are working for (Johnson et al, 1996; Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003). A recommended solution to the principal-agent problem is separation of the role of the 
chair and the CEO (Dalton & Dalton, 2005; Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2007). A trend in the 
governance literature  is greater emphasis on the importance of a strong outside director ratio, a 
voting majority of outside directors, an outside director as chair and high outside director 
average tenure to counter balance the principal-agent problem that can emerge in the work 
performance of the CEO and inside directors (Johnson et al, 1996; Walters, Kroll & Wright, 
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2007). Advocates of agency theory also recommend a small number of inside directors on the 
board to provide an internal monitoring role and to advise the board on the activities and work 
performance of the CEO (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Johnson et al, 1996).  
 
     Stewardship theory argues that company directors are essentially trustworthy individuals and 
good stewards of firm resources. There is a high level of goal alignment between the 
shareholders, inside directors and outside directors. Each of these stakeholders is committed to 
the long run survival and prosperity of the firm and therefore will work in the firm's best interests 
(Lynall, Golden & Hillman, 2003). Advocates of stewardship theory support the presence of 
inside directors on the board. With this approach inside directors take on more of an advising 
role (Fama & Jensen, 1983). They argue that board of director design prescriptions of agency 
theorists can be counter-productive and an impediment to decision-making. A balance of inside 
and outside directors improves board deliberation and organization performance (Johnson et al, 
1996). Stewardship theory also applies well to small and medium size enterprises which are 
characterized by strong executive identification with the firm, an involvement-oriented 
executive, low levels of institutional power, social fulfilment and personal fulfilment of the 
executives (Johnson et al, 1996; Kroll, Walters & Le, 2007). 
 
     Resource dependence theory argues that the board of directors is another instrument that 
management may use to gain access to the resources required to effectively run the business. 
Directors in this role may be representing particular institutions or are serving some legitimizing 
function (Selznick, 1949; Pfeffer, 1972; Johnson et al, 1996). Daily and Dalton (1992) found that 
the resource dependence role is important for younger small and medium size enterprises 
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(SMEs) as access to capital, legal services, financial services and/or other organization resource 
needs is more difficult compared with larger, more established firms (Johnson et al, 1996). In 
this respect inside directors can provide a useful firm resource in an advisory and monitoring 
role, keeping the outside directors informed of the activities and job performance of the CEO   
(Fama & Jensen, 1983; Johnson et al, 1996).  
 
     Table 1 below provides summary details of representative studies of CEO tenure, chair CEO 
co-tenure, the inside director ratio and organization performance that help to inform this study. 
The dependent variable for the studies in Table 1 are a performance variable and this is not 
subject to uniform definition. While archival studies using measures such as average return on 
assets or Tobin’s Q are more popular, they do not give the same insight into different dimensions 
of organization performance provided by perceptual measures (Richard, Devinney, Yip, Johnson, 
2009). 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
     These representative studies give certain points of guidance to this study. First there is little 
research considering chair and CEO co-tenure and the implications of this for organization 
performance. Second there is little consideration given in the literature to identifying 
constellations where the ratio of inside directors can play a positive or negative role for the 
organization. This relates to the debate in the corporate governance field on the value of the 
contribution inside directors make to firm performance and the appropriate time for inside 
directors to make that contribution. Kroll et al (2007) and Johnson et al (1996), for example,  
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have called for further research in this inside director area with a view to reintroducing the inside 
director to the research agenda and exploring aspects of their work context such as their work 
relationship with the chair and CEO.  
 
2.2 Hypotheses 
2.2.1 CEO tenure in a separation context 
     Stewardship theory indicates that a good steward of the firm in the CEO role will last longer 
in the job and perform better; this suggests a positive linear relationship between CEO tenure and 
organization performance (Coles et al., 2001). An alternative view is that there are seasons to 
CEO tenure with implications for organization performance with a period of improving 
performance in the early years and a later period of performance decline; this is a curvilinear 
(inverted U-shape) or quadratic relationship (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Shen, 2003; Simsek, 
2007). The theory informing the quadratic relationship is that early in his or her tenure the CEO 
is likely to respond to his or her mandate from the chair and board on the change program 
expected and communicated during the hiring process. After addressing the CEOs initial 
mandate the second season may be a period of experimentation, but some CEOs may choose to 
bypass this season if they have strong belief in their view of the organization, the environment 
and their initial strategy. The third stage is the selection of an enduring theme for how the 
organization should be structured and positioned. This often reflects a reinforcement of the 
paradigms the CEO applied in the first and possibly second phase. The fourth stage is one of 
convergence where the enduring theme is reinforced by a series of incremental choices often 
related to organization structure, processes, the leadership team or other functional initiatives. 
The final stage is one of dysfunction where the CEO’s continuing presence in the firm is counter-
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productive due to fatigue, boredom and/or a dulling of entrepreneurial instincts (Miller, 1991; 
Simsek, 2007). Long serving CEOs also become less likely to engage in monitoring of the 
environment and adaptation (Coles et al., 2001). So theory and prior studies give the two 
possibilities here, a positive linear correlation between CEO tenure and performance, or the 
curvilinear (inverted U-shape) relationship. The best answer remains a point of debate in the 
literature. In the under researched separation setting such as Australia the CEO is often the lead 
or only inside director as distinct from United States studies in a mainly duality practicing 
setting. Coles et al (2001) argue that the research evidence is so far stronger for the linear 
relationship reflecting stewardship theory, hence: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between CEO tenure and organization 
performance. 
 
2.2.2 “Two great stewards” - chair and CEO co-tenure 
     The chair is mentor and confidant of the CEO and together they exert substantial influence on 
firm culture. The chair oversees board routines and the building of experience across the inside 
directors and outside directors respectively. The relational skills of the chair are important for 
ensuring members of the board work effectively as a group with the CEO, and this can also take 
time to build, nurture and mature (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003a; Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2007). A 
key role of the chair is to monitor the performance of the CEO and keep the CEO focused on the 
key strategic challenges of the business, ensuring the CEO does not pursue self-interest (i.e. the 
principal–agent problem) and does pursue the interests of shareholders (Westphal & Zajac, 1995; 
Kiel & Nicholson, 2003a). The work relationship between the chair and CEO is crucial to 
business success and it is complicated. There are crucial power, mentoring, values, information 
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and knowledge exchanges taking place and these exchanges take time to evolve and mature 
(Westphal, 1999). Kakabadse & Kakabadse (2007: 182) found the chair performed their role best 
as a “long-term anchor” occupying the role for periods of 12 to 15 years. This long term 
stewardship provided by the chair provided some balance for the organization and its 
shareholders with CEO tenure lasting from three to five years. CEOs who are good stewards last 
longer in the role (Johnson et al, 1996). Given this background a chair and CEO who are both 
good stewards are more likely to spend more time working together and deliver performance 
results, hence: 
H2: There is a positive relationship between co-tenure of the chair and CEO and 
organization performance. 
 
2.2.3 “Two great stewards” or “too comfortable in the saddle”  – the interaction effect 
     Boyd et al. (2011) have identified the importance of using moderation terms to build 
theoretical and practical insight in corporate governance research. Trying to understand how to 
obtain high organization performance from the chair, CEO and inside directors is an area that 
benefit from this approach. 
 
Stewardship theory and agency theory suggest that at least a few inside directors can have a 
favorable influence on organization performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Johnson et al, 1996; 
Kiel & Nicholson, 2003b; Kroll et al, 2007). On the other hand a strong and experienced chair 
and CEO team may prefer to limit the number of inside directors - most likely the CEO only - to 
maximize their strategic and financial influence. Elite chair and CEO talent – “two great 
stewards” - is rare and special with long tenure evidence of good stewardship (Kakabadse & 
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Kakabadse, 2007). Long tenure for the chair CEO duo allows time for mentoring, sharing of 
values plus sharing of information and knowledge. For elite performers this creates a powerful 
combination of human resources beneficial to organization performance. However, this 
relationship may be less productive if there are more inside directors on the board.  
 
The possible adverse side effect of the chair and CEO working together for too long with a larger 
number of inside directors is that the company can experience a situation where cohesiveness and 
harmony become too high. When this occurs there may be a lack of strategic tension, a lack of 
constructive conflict, a weakening of entrepreneurial instinct and a loss of competitive edge for 
the organization as a whole. In this situation it is possible that external voices from independent 
outside directors are not heard leading to a state of the chair, CEO and inside directors becoming 
too close and comfortable in their professional relationships similar to a lack of constructive 
conflict in innovation management (Souder, 1987; Leenders and Wierenga, 2008). The 
consequence of this, labeled “too comfortable in the saddle” syndrome, is likely to result in lower 
organization performance (Simsek, 2007). This is especially problematic in the context of the 
different and competing goals organizations have to balance that can challenge chair, CEO and 
inside director problem identification, problem solving and situation management skills (Hillman 
et al., 2000).  
 
In summary, whereas having a low inside director ratio can have a favorable influence on 
organization performance when chair CEO co-tenure is long (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Johnson et 
al, 1996; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003b; Kroll et al, 2007), having a high inside director ratio in an 
organization where chair CEO co-tenure is long, can be less beneficial for performance. This 
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background provides the basis for a relationship that is multiplicative with long chair CEO co-
tenure relationship in firms likely to perform best with a smaller number of inside directors 
(Boyd et al., 2011):  
H3: Chair CEO co-tenure moderates the relationship between the inside 
director ratio and organization performance such that where chair CEO co-
tenure is high and the inside director ratio is low then organization 
performance is high. 
 
Methods 
3.1 Sample selection 
     The data for analysis is provided by 102 Australian Stock Exchange Listed firms who 
responded to a mail out survey conducted in the 2008-2009 financial year. An initial sampling 
frame of 1000 companies was developed. A total of 52 surveys were returned unopened 
(respondent moved, incorrect address etc.) giving a response rate of 10.8 % from a double mail 
out; this is an acceptable outcome for upper echelons and/or key informant research (Simsek, 
Veiga, Lubatkin & Dino, 2005; Simsek, 2007; Heavey, Simsek, Roche & Kelly, 2009). The mail 
out was directed to the Managing Director and/or CEO in each firm who had the discretion to 
respond to the survey or delegate the survey to their chosen key informant to provide a company 
response. A total of 90 surveys were returned by Managing Directors and/or CEOs, five by the 
Senior Strategy Officer, three by Company Secretary’s, two by Chief Financial Officers, and two 
by top managers. Each respondent confirmed in the survey they were the key informant 
providing the company response. The survey received 12 responses from firms with more than 
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1000 employees, 23 responses from firms with 100 to 1000 employees, and 67 responses from 
firms with less than 100 employees.  
 
     ANOVA tests were conducted to detect any bias in the survey responses for the key 
constructs to determine if the early respondents (N = 51) differed from the later respondents (N = 
51). There were no significant differences between the two groups, indicating that non response 
is not a major concern (Newbert, 2008). In addition, the sample resembles the ASX well in terms 
of size and industries providing additional evidence that the sample is generalizable towards the 
broader population.  The survey used for this study is provided in the Appendix below.  
 
3.2 Measures 
3.2.1 Independent variables 
     The survey in the Appendix shows that in relation to the governance questions the key 
informant respondent was asked questions on tenure in years and months of the chair and the 
CEO in the organization, the number of inside directors on the board, and the number of 
directors in total on the board. The overlap of the chair and CEO tenure in their respective roles 
was then calculated for the chair CEO co-tenure variable. The responses to these questions were 
used as variables in the study for CEO tenure, chair CEO co-tenure and the insider ratio (i.e. the 
number of inside directors divided by board size). This survey data was then cross-checked back 
to company annual reports for the 67 companies that reported their name on 10 questions that 
could be checked with archival sources to verify accuracy (i.e. 670 data entries). Only two minor 
amendments were required in the 670 data entries confirming the quality of the data. 
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3.2.3 Dependent variable 
     The dependent variable for this study is ‘outside the box’ in that a perceived organization 
performance survey instrument is used to gather key informant opinion. Most corporate 
governance research uses archival measures of financial performance (e.g. Tobin’s Q, average 
return on assets) though an increasingly diverse range of dependent variables (e.g. corporate R & 
D strategy) are being used (Baysinger et al, 1991; Johnson et al, 1996; Kiel & Nicholson, 
2003b). Richard, Devinney, Yip and Johnson (2009: 719) note that organization performance is 
“the ultimate dependent variable of interest” for business and management researchers. In 
relation to organization performance this section of the survey asked key informant respondents 
for their assessment of the non-financial and financial performance of their organization 
compared with their rivals over the past three years on Likert scale ratings from 1 = Very Poor to 
7 = Excellent. A selection of six items was prepared adapting Homburg, Krohmer and 
Workman’s (1999) multi-dimensional organization performance survey scale giving content 
validity. 
 
     Perceived organization performance scales provide a superior insight on strategic 
performance and an alternative to archival data on financial performance. Archival sources on 
strategic performance are limited (e.g. percentage sales growth) when compared with the breadth 
of key informant insight that can be obtained from a perceptual survey scale providing a multi-
dimensional insight into the construct (Richard et al, 2009). Company annual reports were used 
to obtain return on assets (i.e. net income divided by total assets) data for the 2009-2010 and 
2010-2011 financial years for the respondent companies where this information was available (N 
= 67). Average two years return on assets was then calculated to provide an actual measure of 
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objective organization performance for comparison with the dependent variable used throughout 
the study. 
 
3.2.4 Control variables 
     Information on years listed on the stock exchange and also firm size measured by total 
number of employees was collected; this data was positively skewed so the common log (i.e. 
base 10 log) was calculated for both variables and used in the analysis. Average board of 
director size, average board of director tenure and chair tenure was used to give an indication of 
board experience and expertise. Information on separation of the chair and CEO role was 
obtained in the survey and a categorical variable with 1 = Separation and 0 = Duality prepared.  
 
     Industries represented in the sample include materials (28 companies), healthcare (18 
companies) with the remaining firms (56 companies) from the financial services, industrials, 
information technology, telecommunications, energy, and consumer discretionary industries. To 
provide a broad insight on industry influence dummy variables for materials, healthcare and 
other industries were prepared (Simsek, Veiga & Lubatkin, 2007). The materials and healthcare 
dummy variables were included in the bivariate correlations and multiple regression that follows 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). 
 
3.2.5 Survey scale reliability and validity 
     Hinkin’s (1995, 1998) guidance on preparing survey scales that evidence reliability (i.e. the 
measure is free from error and yields consistent results) and validity (i.e. we are measuring what 
we say we measure) was carefully followed (Cortina, 1993). Before the mail out the organization 
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performance survey was inspected by two University professors and two prominent Australian 
company directors for face or content validity. There was general agreement among the 
reviewers that the “scale logically appears to be accurately reflecting what was intended to be 
measured” (Zikmund, 1997: 443). Following preliminary analysis to check for data quality and 
accuracy, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using principal axis factoring with oblique rotation 
was used for the initial data reduction for the organization performance scale resulting in two 
factors. Factor 1 is the financial performance sub-scale. Factor 2 is the strategic performance 
sub-scale. Factor loadings are above 0.40 (Ford, McCallum & Tait, 1986; Kim & Mueller, 1978). 
The residual correlation matrix evidenced acceptable levels of correlation between the items and 
there were no cross loading or complex items (Kline, 1994). Communalities were sound.  
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
     AMOS was then used to perform a CFA on the two factor solution. Results showed that the 
fit of the two factor model was adequate with x2 (8, N = 102) = 11.83, CFI = 1.00, TLI = 0.99, 
NFI = 0.99, RMSEA = 0.07. A one factor solution as an alternative to the two factor model was 
then explored, seeking to ascertain if the strategic performance and financial performance sub-
scales evidencing acceptable correlation in the EFA correlation matrix should merge. The fit of 
the one factor model to the data was significantly worse x2 (10, N = 102) = 271.44, CFI = 0.68, 
TLI = .33, NFI = .68, RMSEA = 0.51. This finding confirms the suitability of the two factor 
model and provides some evidence of discriminant validity of the strategic and financial 
dimensions of organization performance. The Cronbach’s alpha for the strategic performance 
sub-scale is 0.89 and for the financial performance sub-scale 0.98. The bivariate correlations 
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(Table 3 below) were then examined to ensure no presence of multicollinearity or singularity 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001) and obtain a univariate grasp of the relationship between the 
dependent variable and each of the independent variables (Coakes & Steed, 2001).  
 
     Multiple regression analysis was then used to test the correlation between perceived financial 
performance and actual average two year return on assets to try and better understand the overall 
study. This relationship was significant with the control variables included in the analysis (B = 
8.07, s.e. = 3.41, p<.05) in a significant overall model (p<.05, N = 65, R2 = .46). This finding 
provides evidence in support of the predictive validity of the perceived organization performance 
survey scale (Hart & Banbury, 1994; Richard et al, 2009; Khan, 2011). 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
3.2.6 Common method variance 
     Common method variance (CMV) refers to the variance that is attributable to the 
measurement method rather than to the construct of interest. CMV may exist due to the single 
survey method used to collect responses. This potential threat was addressed by following 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee & Podsakoff (2003). At the design stage of the study, four experts 
(two academic and two from industry) were invited to review the survey and certain revisions 
were made to specific items based on their feedback. The survey items in each of the three 
sections were worded quite differently and required a variety of different style of response from 
a period of time (e.g. CEO tenure), to a yes/no response (e.g. Is the current Chairman and CEO 
the same person: Yes/No (please circle)), to Likert scale items on organization performance; this 
was done  to reduce the potential impact of CMV. At the data analysis stage of the study, three 
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statistical techniques were applied to assess CMV. The Harman's one-factor test indicated that 
there was more than one factor that accounted for the majority of covariance. In the partial 
correlation procedures, the measurement model was shown not to be affected greatly after a 
general factor was added into the model. Finally, the marker-variable technique indicated a low 
percentage (< .7%) of significance change to variable correlations when adjusted for CMV. In 
sum, the analysis shows that CMV is not a big concern in this study. 
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Multiple regression results 
     Table 5 and Table 6 present the result of the multiple regression analysis for the dependent 
variables strategic performance and financial performance respectively. The relationships are 
examined in this study using multiple regression and moderated multiple regression (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986). The moderator variable used in the study is the insider ratio. Before preparing the 
two-way interaction term used in this study (i.e. chair CEO co-tenure x insider ratio) component 
variables were centred to reduce multicollinearity (Aiken & West, 1991; Walters et al, 2007). 
Model 1 in Table 5 with the dependent variable strategic performance and Model 1 in Table 6 
with the dependent variable financial performance present the models with the controls only. 
Table 4 Model 2 and Table 5 Model 2 present the results of the multiple regression analysis for 
the independent variables and the moderation variable. The results for hypothesis one, two and 
three are presented in Table 4 Model 3 and Table 5 Model 3 respectively. The parsimonious 
models are provided in Table 4 Model 4 and Table 5 Model 4 respectively. 
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     Hypothesis 1 states that there is a positive relationship between CEO tenure and organization 
performance. The bivariate correlations in Table 3 evidence positive significant support for this 
hypothesis for both strategic performance (p<.01) and financial performance (p<.05). Model 3 
will be used for hypothesis testing and interpretation as this model includes all relationships 
(Edwards, 2008). CEO tenure is significant in Model 3 for both strategic performance (p<.05) 
and financial  performance (p<.01). This supports Hypothesis 1. Interestingly, similar results are 
also found for the parsimonious model for strategic performance (p<.05) and financial 
performance (p<.05) respectively. Hypothesis 2 states that there is a positive relationship 
between chair CEO co-tenure and organization performance however in Table 4 Model 3 and 
Table 5 Model 6 respectively this hypothesis is not supported. Bivariate correlations in Table 3 
show positive significant support for the dependent variable strategic performance (p>.05). 
Finally hypothesis 3 states that chair CEO co-tenure moderates the relationship between the 
inside director ratio and organization performance such that where chair CEO co-tenure is high 
and the inside director ratio is low then organization performance is high. In Table 4 Model 3 the 
moderator term (p<.01) is highly significant in a negative relationship with strategic performance 
in support of the hypothesis. Model 3 is highly significant overall (p<.01). Table 5 Model 3 
shows the result for the dependent variable perceived financial performance. In step three the 
moderator term is a significant negative influence (p<.05). The model is significant overall 
(p<.05). Hypothesis three is supported. 
 
     In order to understand the results of hypothesis three in more detail moderation plots were 
prepared. Figure 1 plots the significant interaction term for the dependent variable strategic 
performance. Where the chair CEO co-tenure is high and the inside director ratio is low strategic 
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performance is at its highest level. Figure 2 plots the significant interaction term for the 
dependent variable financial performance. Where chair CEO tenure is high and the inside 
director ratio is low financial performance is at its highest level again. These plots support the 
theory development on “two great stewards” and hypothesis three. An interesting anomaly is that 
the high insider ratio moderation plot in Figure 1 and Figure 2 indicates that a high insider ratio 
helps the company achieve better strategic performance and financial performance levels where 
there is low chair CEO co-tenure. 
 
     Opinions diverge with respect to control variables and whether to include them or not 
(Woodside, 2013). More importantly, whereas more control variables increase fit, achieving fit 
does not necessarily mean the model is good, and choosing the model with the best fit is likely to 
result in poor predictions (Woolridge, 2013). As a result, we estimate the parsimonious model 
using half the data (50%) and estimate the performance outcome variable in a holdout sample 
and compare it to the real values. This was done for strategic performance (predictive model: y1= 
4.846 + .008 (x1) + .006 (x2) + 1.063 (x3) -.042 (x4)) and financial performance (predictive 
model: z1 = 4.376 + .013 (x1) + .004 (x2) + 2.669 (x3) - .043 (x4)). Using the observations in the 
holdout sample the predictions are significantly correlated with the real performance outcomes 
r=.35 (p<.02) and r=.33 (p<.03) offering support that the model has predictive power (Gigerenzer 
& Brighton, 2009).  
 
4.2.2 Endogeneity bias 
     The key aim in the study is to find out whether high chair CEO co-tenure causes better 
performance in th     e context of a low insider ratio. In an ideal research setting, to test such a 
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cause and effect proposition, examining the impact of chair CEO co-tenure on organization 
performance would be done by randomly assigning firms to different co-tenure and insider ratio 
groups. Performance levels would then be observed across the groups (Angrist & Krueger, 
2001). In this survey study, the firms are not randomly selected and this may lead to unreliable 
estimates (Woolridge, 2013).  
 
     A comprehensive approach to explore the severity of possible endogeneity issues is pursued. 
First, in the design of the study, there is effort to ensure sources of endogeneity problems such as 
omission of important variables, reverse causality, and measurement error in the variables of 
interest are minimized (Roberts & Whited, 2011). In terms of missing variables for example, this 
study is one of the most comprehensive studies to date by studying chair CEO co-tenure and the 
insider ratio in one theoretical framework. This is an under researched area (Johnson et al.’ 1996; 
Boyd et al., 2011). In terms of reverse causality, many studies support the notion argued in this 
paper that tenure affects performance through company specific resource accumulation and 
exploitation (e.g. Coles et al., 2001; Tian et al., 2011). In essence, the inclusion of control 
variables in a multivariate regression is another attempt to deal with the non-random nature of the 
treatment effect. What the results do show is that the inclusion of control variables is not 
affecting the core relationships found in the results, evidencing that the relationships have been 
investigated in a relatively controlled environment. Finally, several Hausman Wu (Hausman, 
1978) tests were conducted to determine the existence of an endogeneity issue, and thus the 
appropriateness of using multiple regression. Using instrumental variables that can predict chair 
CEO tenure (but that are not related to the dependent variable), results from the two stage least 
squares approach show that endogeneity is not a major concern. The null hypothesis that there is 
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an endogeneity problem is rejected for both performance variables using different sets of 
instrumental variables. For example, using the previous chair’s tenure and some (previously not 
used) industry dummies as a predictor of current chair CEO co-tenure, endogeneity issues are 
clearly rejected (F = .676, p = .732 for strategic performance), and (F = 1.503, p = .23 for 
financial performance). A possible weak identification problem is also rejected with first stage F 
values below 4 (F = 1.314 for strategic performance; F = 1.884 for strategic performance). 
Similar patterns were observed across different instrumental variable sets.  
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
5.1 Theoretical implications 
     Theory development on governance and tenure is often based on United States governance 
configurations. In these studies there are most frequently limited to zero differences in tenure 
between the chair and CEO because of the wide practice of duality. In Anglo legal jurisdictions 
including Australia and the United Kingdom there is much wider practice of separation with the 
appointment of a different person to the chair and the CEO roles respectively (Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003a). This study shows that new governance insights emerge from studying non- 
United States governance configurations, in this case the Australian configuration has important 
theoretical and practical implications for chair, CEO and inside director research. This study 
unpacks the complex relationship between the chair, the CEO and inside directors in an 
environment of separation and shows how these people working together can deliver better 
organization performance.  
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     In the first instance this study shows that stewardship theory provides the theoretical 
underpinning for the argument that CEOs who are good stewards with long tenure will work for 
organizations that perform strongly over time. This was supported in the results with the 
financial performance dependent variable for hypothesis 1 in an Anglo separation environment. 
This result supports the observation of Coles et al. (2001) that the weight of evidence favours the 
linear relationship for this hypothesis and provides important insight into the context for the next 
two hypotheses as understanding of the role of inside directors in the organization is developed 
here. The CEO is often the only or the lead inside director making this insight here relevant, 
timely and complementary to theory building for hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3. 
 
     The theoretical argument for hypothesis 2 notes the critical work relationship between the 
chair and the CEO that develops over time (Daily and Dalton, 1997). This chair CEO co-tenure 
and performance relationship was not supported in the multiple regression results of this study 
but the hypothesis merits further investigation given the theory presented here and the positive 
significant bivariate correlation result for the dependent variable strategic performance. There is 
a sound theoretical case that when “two great stewards” work together in the chair and CEO role 
for a period of time a synergy can develop in their work relationship through the sharing of 
crucial power, mentoring, values, information and knowledge exchanges. 
 
     The moderated multiple regression result for hypothesis 3 is of most interest given the limited 
insight into inside directors in the literature (Johnson et al., 1996). The learning from the result 
for hypothesis 3 is that there is value to the organization in having a strong, capable, experienced 
chair and CEO duo and a low inside director ratio to achieve the highest levels of strategic 
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performance and also the highest levels of financial performance. The plots for Figure 1 and 
Figure 2 respectively reinforce this “two great stewards” theory. There are exceptional strategists 
out there in the business community working together in chair and CEO roles and companies 
benefit from their long tenure working together (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2007). Another side 
to this story on reflection could be that the elite chair and CEO duo may benefit from having 
more access to outside directors and external consultants to challenge their thinking and 
formulate an effective strategy when the inside director ratio is low. However consistent with 
Kiel and Nicholson (2003a) we remain sceptical on the value of outside directors on the board 
after our analysis here shows when inside directors can add value to organization performance. 
 
     The theory development also identifies another situation where the general benefit of having 
“two great stewards” leading to high performance becomes more complex because of the side-
effect of having both the CEO and the chair in their role for a longer period of time working with 
a large number of inside directors. This is the first study that discusses and evidences less than 
optimal performance outcomes and a risk of being “too comfortable in the saddle” when 
cohesiveness and harmony of the chair, CEO and inside directors working together become too 
high. Related to this is the important supporting role inside directors can play at the right time in 
the history of the tenure structure of the organization, supporting the chair and CEO duo when 
they lack co-work experience to improve organization performance when the performance 
alternative with low chair CEO co-tenure and a low insider ratio is not viable (Johnson et al., 
1996).  
 
5.2 Practical implications 
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     In relation to the main effects in hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 the major practical implication 
is the benefit to the organization of having the right person in the chair and CEO role 
respectively and giving those strategy workers the time to formulate and implement a strategy. 
There also appears to be some evidence that this duo working together for a period of time has a 
beneficial impact but that the organization will need to invest time in allowing this work 
relationship to mature. If the chair and CEO are performing well in their respective roles then 
they should enjoy the support of the investment community and key shareholders to allow them 
to establish their work relationship and build a track record of performance. 
 
     In relation to the interaction effect the plot of the moderated multiple regression results shown 
in Figure 1 and Figure 2 below do provide telling and slightly different insights into practice 
from this study that have implications for board structure and human resource succession 
practices and this will be unpacked now. 
 
     Firstly Figure 1 shows that strategic performance is highest where there is high chair CEO co-
tenure and a low insider ratio from hypothesis three. This is the optimal board composition and 
human resource setting for strategic performance and companies need to carefully plan chair and 
CEO succession to achieve these high levels of resource capability. This human resource setting 
is hard to acquire with a long path dependency requiring careful planning, sound human 
performance and organization performance to ensure the chair and CEO working as “two great 
stewards” have time to mature in their respective roles together. Another practical insight in 
Figure 1 is the comparatively flat slope of the high insider ratio plot compared with the low 
insider ratio plot. This indicates where low chair CEO co-tenure occurs due to illness, death, 
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executive or board sacking, or poaching of executive talent a decision to increase the insider ratio 
can help the organization achieve sound performance but not optimal performance. Sound but 
not optimal performance can also be achieved with high chair CEO co-tenure and a high insider 
ratio but this is evidence of the “too  comfortable in the saddle” syndrome; this setting does not 
achieve the high levels of strategic performance of high chair and CEO co-tenure and a low 
insider ratio. Lowest levels of strategic performance occur where there is low chair CEO co-
tenure and a low insider ratio and should be avoided in board composition and succession 
planning. 
 
     Figure 2 depicts the plot for the dependent variable financial performance in hypothesis three. 
Financial performance is highest where there is high chair CEO co-tenure and a low insider ratio; 
this again is the optimal human resource setting for financial performance with a long path 
dependency. An interesting scenario is where there is high chair CEO co-tenure and a high 
insider ratio. This is again the “too comfortable in the saddle” scenario where the chair and CEO 
working together are no longer delivering optimal financial performance but a sound level of 
financial performance. Sound but not optimal levels of financial performance are achieved also 
with low chair CEO co-tenure and a high insider ratio; this result is superior to high chair CEO 
co-tenure and a high insider ratio. This particular scenario is favorable where there is illness, 
death, executive or board sacking, or poaching of executive talent upsetting board composition 
and board succession planning. Johnson et al (1996) and Boyd et al. (2011) identified this as an 
area of future research interest and these practical implications help to address this gap, 
especially in relation to when the appointment of inside directors is useful to the organization. 
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5.3 Limitations 
     A view expressed in the literature is that key informant surveys do require some caution in 
terms of interpretation, so the key informant design of this research is a limitation of this paper 
(Bowman & Ambrosini, 1997). However, key informant research surveys are a credible source 
of data collection for corporate governance research (Kumar, Stern & Anderson, 1993). The 
sample collected includes 10.8% of the survey database which is acceptable for an upper echelon 
study. Important checks on the quality of data collection were included in the research, with 
survey scale and analysis techniques at the upper level of rigor suggested by Hinkin (1995, 
1998). The mail out targeted the chair, CEO or executive chair depending on the organization 
structure of the company targeted for the survey. Questions in the survey were prepared to allow 
the chair, CEO or executive chair, or the key informant chosen by the organization, to prepare 
the response. Questions in the survey on the structure and experience of the board of directors 
were arranged and worded quite differently to the questions on perceived organization 
performance, reducing risk of common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Overall the research 
presented here is a plausible, reliable and valid piece of evidence informed by use of quality 
received literature. 
 
5.4 Future research 
     There is evidence in the literature of wide differences in practices of corporate governance 
between countries. An example of difference is the two-tier board structure in countries such as 
Germany and Holland compared with the single tier boards of the United Kingdom, the United 
States and Australia. There is also some discussion of convergence of some corporate 
governance practices between Anglo-American countries and Asian countries. The core 
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argument in this study is that the chair and the CEO need time, resources and stability to work 
together effectively and establish compatible work patterns. An interesting anomaly in the results 
is that at certain moments in the development of an organization inside directors can make a 
useful contribution (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Kroll et al, 2007). It is quite likely that the practice of 
matters discussed in this study on giving the chair and the CEO time and resources to work 
together does vary from country to country, and between big business and small and medium 
size enterprises. This study was conducted in Australia and these findings are likely to transfer 
well to similar legal systems and business cultures (e.g. United Kingdom, Canada). Replication 
of this study in other legal jurisdictions and business cultures (e.g. China, Japan) or less mature 
stock exchanges (e.g. Saudi Arabia) may yield interesting results for comparison. A number of 
leading writers including Hambrick, Verder & Zajac (2008), Hambrick et al. (2008) and Dalton 
and Dalton (2005) identify a number of interesting organization studies matters for research that 
apply to corporate governance. These matters include but are not solely limited to how a 
company board builds group cohesion, teamwork, compatible work patterns, firm knowledge, 
industry knowledge and networks. This is a wide and substantial future research agenda. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
     The learning from this study on the trade-off companies can make on chair CEO co-tenure 
and the number of inside directors on the board is a useful new insight that connects well with 
the findings of Kroll et al. (2007). As expected from the theory development here strong chair 
CEO co-tenure and a low insider ratio delivers optimal strategic and financial performance 
results; “two great stewards” deliver the highest performance levels. High chair CEO co-tenure 
and a high insider ratio delivers sound but not optimal performance, giving evidence of the “too 
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comfortable in the saddle” syndrome when work colleagues lose their competitive edge working 
together. In an interesting anomaly the high insider ratio moderation plots in Figure 1 and Figure 
2 show that a high insider ratio helps the company achieve better strategic performance and 
financial performance levels where there is low chair CEO co-tenure. In the circumstance of low 
chair CEO co-tenure then having a high inside director ratio on the board can be a useful human 
resource approach for the organization that can be controlled by the human resource team with a 
quicker and easier path dependency. 
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Table 1: Representative studies of CEO tenure, chair CEO co-tenure, the inside director ratio and organization performance 
 
Author Year Focus of the Study Sample 
Size 
Method(s) Board of Director and/or CEO Tenure 
Conclusions 
Pfeffer 1972 Size and composition of 
corporate boards 
80 Spearman 
correlation 
Deviations from the industry expected inside 
director-outside director ratio resulted in below 
industry average performance. 
Baysinger, Kosnik 
and Turk 
1991 Influence of board 
structure and share 
ownership on research 
and development (R & 
D) spending 
176 Multiple 
regression 
The percentage of inside directors correlates 
positively with research and development 
spending. 
Miller 1991 CEO tenure and the 
match of strategy and 
structure to the 
environment 
95 Structural 
equation 
modelling 
The path from CEO tenure to performance was 
not significant. The path from CEO tenure to 
performance works through the match of strategy 
and structure to the environment. 
Coles et al. 2001 Governance 
mechanisms and 
performance 
144 Multiple 
regression 
including 
moderation 
CEOs with long tenure and boards comprising 
insiders jointly correlate with declining market 
performance. 
Shen and Cannella 2002 Performance 
consequences of CEO 
succession 
228 Hierarchical 
multiple 
regression 
There is an inverted U-shape relationship 
between departing CEO tenure and post 
succession return on assets. Inversion point is 
when CEO tenure is approximately 14 years. 
Wu, Levitas and 
Priem 
2005 CEO tenure and 
company invention 
where technological 
dynamism varies 
339 Poisson 
regression 
There is an inverted U-shape relationship 
between CEO tenure and invention. Shorter 
tenure CEOs achieve more invention in more 
dynamic technological environments, long tenure 
CEOs achieve more invention in more stable 
environments. 
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Table 1: Representative studies of CEO tenure, chair CEO co-tenure, the inside director ratio and organization performance 
(continued) 
 
Author Year Focus of the Study Sample 
Size 
Method(s) Board of Director and/or CEO Tenure 
Conclusions 
Henderson, Miller 
and Hambrick 
2006 Industry dynamism, 
CEO tenure and firm 
performance 
326 Generalized 
estimating 
equations 
In the stable food industry firm performance 
improved with tenure and declined only for the 
few CEOs serving more than 10-15 years. In the 
dynamic computer industry CEOs performed 
more strongly early in their tenure, then 
performance declined steadily. 
Simsek 2007 CEO tenure and 
organization 
performance 
465 Structural 
equation 
modelling 
CEO tenure indirectly influences firm 
performance through its direct influence on top 
management team (TMT) risk-taking propensity 
and pursuit of entrepreneurial initiatives. CEO 
tenure has a positive linear relationship with 
TMT risk-taking. 
Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse 
2007 Chair 103 In-depth 
interviews 
Chair serves as the long term anchor of the firm. 
CEO and chair interrelations are critical, 
especially building trust and respect over time. 
Walters et al 2007 CEO tenure, board 
structure and firm 
acquisition performance 
313 Multiple 
regression 
Where the board is not vigilant CEO tenure has a 
curvilinear relationship with performance 
(inverted U-shape). Where the board is vigilant 
length of CEO tenure correlates positively with 
performance. 
Coles, Daniel and 
Laveen 
2008 Different aspects of 
corporate governance 
and performance 
144 Multiple 
regression 
A greater number of inside directors compared 
with outside directors and the greater the period 
of the CEO in the job, then performance 
declines. No difference between linear and 
curvilinear analysis of CEO tenure and 
performance. 
Tian et al. 2011 New CEO selection 
events and investor 
reactions 
208 Multiple 
regression 
Overlap of board co-working experience 
correlates positively with cumulative abnormal 
stock return. 
  
 
Table 2 Organization performance scale - principal axis factoring with oblique rotation  
 1 2 
Return on equity .98  
Return on assets .98  
Net profit before tax .92  
Achieving customer retention  .94 
Achieving customer satisfaction  .94 
Achieving sales growth  .64 
   
Eigenvalues 3.93 1.44 
Percentage of variance explained 65.51 23.94 
Note: Principal axis factoring with Oblique Rotation delta -0.2. Factor loadings below 0.40 have 
been suppressed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3 Means, standard deviation and bivariate correlations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+ p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001 (one-tailed) 
 
 Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Log of size by number 
employees 
 1.70   1.05 1           
2 Log of years listed 
ASX 
   .78    .42  .36***  1          
3 Board average tenure 50.61 33.54  .28**   .28**  1         
4 Board size  5.89  7.29  .01   .03   .04  1        
5 Chair CEO separation  1.91    .29 -.03   .05  -.21*   .1  1       
6 Chair tenure 46.95 50.57  .15   .21*   .52**   .05  -.04  1      
7 Healthcare industry    .18    .38 -.19*  -.05   .11  -.11  -.04   .17*  1     
8 Materials industry    .30    .46 -.31**   .01  -.04   .01  -.17*  -.07  -.31**  1    
9 CEO tenure 44.33 38.78  .15   .1   .46**  -.01  -.21*   .32***  -.00   .01  1   
10 Chair CEO co-tenure 29.54 43.87  .08   .12   .34**  -.03   .01   .57**   .10   .17*   .33***  1  
11 Inside director ratio    .29    .19 -.08  -.28**  -.06  -.25**  -.07  -.06  -.10  -.10   .08   .03  1 
12 Strategic performance  4.82  1.27  .33**   .12   .08  -.04  -.07   .09  -.23**   .00   .23**   .18*   .25** 
13 Financial performance  4.13  2.09  .25**  -.09  -.01  -.13+   .19*  -.06  -.21*  -.27**   .17*  -.02   .26** 
14 Average ROA 2009-
2010 
20.56 409.38  .27*   .17+   .12   .12  -.13   .36**  -.26*  -.05   .28*   .18+   .08 
 Variable 12 13 14 
12 Strategic performance  1   
13 Financial performance   .46**  1  
14 Average ROA 2009-
2010 
  .40**   .22*  1 
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Table 4: Regression results CEO tenure, chair CEO co-tenure, the insider ratio and strategic performance 
 
Model 1 
Strategic  
performance 
B (s.e.) 
Model 2 
Strategic  
performance 
B (s.e.) 
Model 3 
Strategic  
performance 
B (s.e.) 
Model 4 
Strategic  
performance 
B (s.e.) 
Controls     
Constant  5.01 (.19)***  4.94 (.19)***  4.98 (.18)***  4.82 (.12)*** 
Log of number of employees   .13 (.15)   .18 (.15)   .21 (.14)  
Log of years listed ASX   .17 (.34)   .37 (.33)   .16 (.33)  
Board of director average tenure   .00 (.01)  -.00 (.01)  -.00 (.01)  
Board of director average size  -.01 (.02)   .00 (.02)   .00 (.02)  
Chair and CEO separation  -.36 (.47)  -.25 (.46)  -.30 (.44)  
Chair tenure   .00 (.00)   .00 (.00)  -.00 (.00)  
Materials industry  -.13 (.32)  -.05 (.34)  -.09 (.32)  
Healthcare industry  -.85 (.37)*  -.62 (.37)   -.64 (.36)+  
Independent Variables     
CEO tenure    .01 (.00)   .01 (.00)*   .01 (.00)* 
Chair CEO co-tenure    .00 (.00)   .01 (.00)+   .01 (.00) 
Moderator Variable 
Insider ratio 
  1.76 (.73)*  1.03 (.75)  1.08 (.65)+ 
Moderator Term     
Chair CEO co-tenure x Inside 
director ratio 
   -.05 (.02)**  -.04(.02)* 
     
R2   .32   .46   .52   .17 
F  1.33 2.14* 2.72** 4.97 
Adjusted R2   .03   .11   .17   .14 
  df 8, 92 11, 89 12, 88 4, 96 
+ p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001  
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Table 5: Regression results CEO tenure, chair CEO co-tenure, the insider ratio and financial performance 
 
Model 1 
Financial  
performance 
B (s.e.) 
Model 2 
Financial  
performance 
B (s.e.) 
Model 3 
Financial  
performance 
B (s.e.) 
Model 4 
Financial  
performance 
B (s.e.) 
Controls     
Constant  4.83 (.28)***  4.71 (.29)***  4.76 (.28)***  4.14 (.20)*** 
Log of number of employees   .24 (.22)   .31 (.23)   .35 (.22)  
Log of years listed ASX  -.85 (.51)  -.62 (.51)  -.91 (.51)+  
Board of director average tenure   .01 (.01)   .00 (.01)  -.00 (.01)  
Board of director average size  -.05 (.03)+  -.04 (.03)  -.04 (.03)  
Chair and CEO separation  1.24 (.71)+  1.51 (.71)*  1.45 (.69)*  
Chair tenure  -.00 (.00)  -.00 (.01)  -.01 (.01)  
Materials industry -1.34 (.49)** -1.16 (.52)* -1.21 (.50)*  
Healthcare industry -1.66 (.56)** -1.32 (.58)* -1.35 (.56)*  
Independent Variables     
CEO tenure    .01 (.01)*   .02 (.01)**   .01 (.01)* 
Chair CEO co-tenure    .00 (.01)   .01 (.01)  -.00 (.01) 
Moderator Variable 
Insider ratio 
  1.89 (1.13)+   .87 (1.17)  2.37 (1.11)* 
Moderator Term     
Chair CEO co-tenure x Inside 
director ratio    -.07 (.03)* -.04 (.03) 
     
R2   .49   .55   .59   .12 
F 3.61** 3.55*** 3.93*** 3.28* 
Adjusted R2   .17   .22   .26   .08 
  df 8, 92 11, 89 12, 88 4, 96 
+ p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001  
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Figure 1     Hypothesis 3 interaction term plot for the dependent variable strategic performance 
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Figure 2     Hypothesis 3 interaction term plot for the dependent variable financial performance 
 
 
  
 
Appendix 
 
Survey 
Demographic Information: Industry, Year This Organization Listed on the Australian Stock 
Exchange, Number of Employees 
 
Governance Information: Chairman years/months in present position, Board of director size, 
Board of director member average years/months on this board, Number of executive directors on the 
board, Is the current Chairman and CEO the same person: Yes/No (please circle), CEO 
years/months in present position, CEO years/months in this organization 
 
Organization Performance: While answering the following questions, please relate to the situation 
in your company over the last three years. Relative to your competitors with a rating of 1 = Very 
Poor to 7 = Excellent, how has your company performed with respect to: 
Achieving: Sales growth? Customer satisfaction? Customer retention? Financial performance: 
Return on equity? Return on assets? Return on sales? 
